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Summary
We present the results of a survey-experiment – using a representative sample of the Dutch pop-
ulation – in which we relate respondents’ opinion about a restriction of the tax deductibility of
mortgages to their estimates about other people’s opinions. We ﬁnd a strong consensus effect;
meaning that respondents’ estimates of others’ opinions are related to their own opinion. Fur-
thermore, we ﬁnd that the size of the effect is not affected by the ambiguity of the question
posed. The provision of arguments pro and contra the tax provision and monetary incentives for
accuracy reduce the consensus effect, but only so in conjunction. Finally, we ﬁnd that house own-
ers display a signiﬁcantly stronger consensus effect. Our results suggest that both cognitive and
motivational factors are responsible for the consensus effect. Aside from the consensus effect, our
survey gives interesting insights into people’s opinion on tax deductibility of mortgages. A major-
ity consider a general restriction to be unfair, but a proposal to restrict only mortgages as of a
certain size meets with much more approval.
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1 INTRODUCTION
From the social psychological literature it is known that expectations about
others are positively correlated with one’s own behavioural inclinations. This
is called the consensus effect (or social projection). It refers to the tendency
of individuals to see their own preferences and beliefs as relatively common
while viewing alternative preferences and beliefs as relatively uncommon
(Ross et al. (1977)). The consensus effect may thus be seen as a type of
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egocentric bias, in the sense that people overweight their own opinion when
estimating the opinions of others.1
The existence of a consensus effect is of great importance for economics.
In many economic settings, agents must form expectations about the prefer-
ences and beliefs of others in order to make good decisions. In assets markets,
for example, optimal trading strategies rely on one’s expectations about how
other traders believe the market will develop. The optimal bid in an auction
depends on one’s expectation about other bidders’ valuation of the object for
sale. The decision to market a new product will depend on one’s expectation
about the preferences of consumers. It is easy to give other examples of eco-
nomic environments in which expectations about others are crucial to deci-
sion-making.
A standard and crucial assumption in economics is that people have ratio-
nal expectations about the preferences, beliefs, and behaviour of others. This
implies that expectations are correct on average and contain no systematic
(i.e., correctible) biases. However, if people are affected by a consensus effect
this implies that economic decision-making may contain systematic mistakes
and lead to inefﬁcient outcomes. If traders, for example, overestimate the
extent to which their own opinions are representative for those of other trad-
ers, asset prices may be biased (Forsythe et al. (1992)). If bidders with a high
valuation take their own valuation as representative for those of others, this
may lead to overbidding in auctions. If people take their own tastes as rep-
resentative for those of others, this may lead to a high failure rate of small
businesses (Camerer (1995)).
In the social psychological literature there are many documented manifes-
tations of the consensus effect. One can think of candidate preference (Brown
(1982)), approval for the performance of politicians (Goethals et al. (1979)),
agreement on speciﬁc policy decisions (for example boycotting the Olympics)
and consent for political movements (Manstead (1982)). In the economics
literature the evidence is still somewhat mixed, however. On the one hand,
Offerman et al. (1996) looked at individual orientations and expectations
about the behaviour of other subjects in a step-level public good experiment,
using incentive compatible mechanisms. They found that persons with a coop-
erative orientation contributed more than individualists did, but that coop-
erators did not expect more contributions by others than individualists did.
Expectations were not affected systematically by own orientation. Selten and
1 In the psychological literature there seems to be little doubt that the consensus effect is
a judgment bias. Therefore, it is often called the false consensus effect. The argument is that
if both sides on an issue regard their own preference as relatively common at least one side
must be wrong. But as Dawes (1990) put forward this is not necessarily the case. One’s own
preference is an informative signal about the population distribution of preferences. Oneself is
a sample of size one, and if the prior belief about the underlying population distribution is
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Ockenfels (1998), on the other hand, reported the presence of a consensus
effect in the analysis of expectations about the gifts of others in a three-
person-gift game. Those with relatively large gifts also expected relatively
large gifts by others. Similar results have been found by Brosig et al. (2003),
Charness and Grosskopf (2001), and Jacobsen and Sadrieh (1996).
A clever experiment by Engelmann and Strobel (2000) was explicitly
designed to examine whether the consensus effect is false. In each session
16 subjects had to make a choice between two options. After that a subject
received information about the choices made by four other subjects in the
session. Then each subject was asked to predict the choices of the remain-
ing 11 subjects. The results indicate that subjects did use their own choice
when forming an estimate about the choices of the other 11 subjects, but
that they did not weight their own choice more heavily than the choices of
the other 4 subjects they were informed about. In other words, the authors
found a consensus effect but no false consensus effect.2 A follow-up study
by Engelmann and Strobel (2004) showed, however, that the false consensus
effect was destroyed only if representative information about others was pre-
sented to subjects on a ’silver platter’ (like in their earlier study). If a small
cognitive effort was required to retrieve the information then it tended to be
ignored and the false consensus effect reappeared.
Several explanations for the consensus effect have been advanced. These
explanations rely on motivational and cognitive factors (Marks and Miller
(1987), Mullen and Hu (1988)). Motivational explanations emphasize the
functional value of a person’s position relative to the position of others. Sim-
ilarity between self and others may serve to validate the appropriateness of
a person’s position, to maintain self-esteem, and to reduce tension in antici-
pated social interaction. It makes people feel better if they perceive and report
similarity between their own position and that of others. Cognitive explana-
tions, on the other hand, refer to the reasoning and informational processes
that underlie the reported position of others on an issue. Here, two chan-
nels may bring about a correlation between a person’s own position and the
perceived position of others. One is what may be called selective exposure or
availability. To form an estimate of the positions of others in general it is rea-
sonable to rely, at least in part, on the positions one knows that some people
have, including one’s own position (a sample). To the extent that this sam-
ple is biased, it may bring about a consensus effect between one’s own posi-
tion and the position of others. A second cognitive channel is what is called
object construal. Issues and questions are usually ambiguous to some degree
and open to interpretation. The particular interpretation a person gives to an
issue may affect one’s own position as well as the estimated position of others.
2 We note that our study is not directly oriented towards the question whether the consensus
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Insofar as interpretations differ across individuals they may lead to correla-
tions between own position and perceived position of others.
In this paper we investigate the causes of a consensus bias. To that end we
performed a survey-experiment using a representative sample of about 1500
Dutch households. We asked the respondents for their opinion on a proposed
policy change regarding the tax deductibility of the interest on mortgages.
This deductibility has been under serious attack in the Netherlands for some
time. We also asked respondents to estimate the average response to this ques-
tion in the panel. This allows us to assess the strength of the consensus effect
by relating respondents’ own opinions to their estimates of the average opin-
ion.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we examine whether and how the rela-
tionship between own and estimated opinions is affected by three treatment
variables. Firstly, we vary the ambiguity of the question posed. Secondly, we
vary whether or not respondents are provided with a list of arguments pro
and contra the proposed policy change. Finally, we examine whether the pro-
vision of monetary incentives for accuracy affects the consensus effect. Each
of these treatments is targeted at one of the three explanations discussed
above: object construal, selective exposure, and motivation, respectively.
Oursecondgoalistorelatetheconsensuseffecttovarioussocio-demographic
background variables of the respondents, of which especially house owner-
ship seems relevant. As maintaining mortgage deductibility is obviously much
more important for house owners than for tenants, we can, for instance, test
the argument that the strength of a (false) consensus effect depends on the
importance of the topic under consideration (Crano (1983), Campbell (1986),
Marks and Miller (1987)).
Third, our study tries to provide insights in people’s opinions about the tax
deductibility of mortgages. As said, this is a tricky policy issue in the Neth-
erlands and for quite some time it seemed that politicians were not willing to
burn their ﬁngers on the issue. Interestingly, however, a ﬁerce discussion about
a possible restriction has started again recently. Our results might give some
useful insights about people’s opinions on the issue and whether this varies
with the type of restriction proposed. Also we can relate opinions to political
orientation, house ownership and other socio-economic variables. This may
give a better view on the possible political (electoral) consequences of a par-
ticular policy position.
The remainder of the paper reads as follows. Section 2 describes the experi-
mental design and hypotheses. Section 3 starts with a detailed examination of
people’s opinions on the tax deductibility. Section 4 then analyzes the consen-
sus effect. Section 5 discusses the accuracy of the estimates, and examines the
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2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
For the survey-experiment we used the members of the CentERpanel, a large-
scale panel, set-up and maintained by CentERdata, which is a survey research
institute, specialized in Internet-based surveys, afﬁliated with Tilburg Univer-
sity in the Netherlands. The panel consists of some 2000 households in the
Netherlands, whose members ﬁll in a questionnaire on the Internet at home
every week. The panel is representative of the Dutch population with respect
to age, gender, household size, level of education, religion, and region, albeit
that young persons and immigrants are somewhat underrepresented. The sur-
vey was conducted in week 50 of the year 2001. A total of 1761 panel mem-
bers decided to participate, which led to 1454 usable responses (i.e., valid
responses for the main questions; see below).
The topic considered was the tax deductibility of mortgages. Currently,
people can deduct the total amount of interest they pay for their mortgage
from their taxable income. The tax provision is thus particularly beneﬁcial for
people with a high mortgage and a high marginal income tax rate. There have
been several proposals to restrict the tax deductibility of mortgage interest
payments. One proposal, by the Socialist Party (SP), is to set an upper limit
of about 180000 Euro on the part of the mortgage with a tax-deductible inter-
est payment.
We employed three treatment variables in the survey-experiment, in a 2×
2×2 factorial design in which respondents were randomly assigned to one of
eight treatments. Table 1 gives an overview of the treatments and the number
of respondents per treatment. The ﬁrst treatment variable refers to the spec-
iﬁcity of the question posed. One set of respondents was confronted with a
general and ambiguous policy proposal (Ambiguous). They were asked Ques-
tion A1: ‘Do you consider a restriction of the mortgage interest deductibility
to be fair? Give your opinion in the form of a grade on a scale from 1 (very
unfair) to 10 (very fair)’.3 The other respondents were presented with a more
speciﬁc proposal (Speciﬁc), Question A2: ‘Do you consider a restriction of the
mortgage interest deductibility for mortgages above 180000 Euro to be fair?
Give your opinion in the form of a grade on a scale from 1 (very unfair) to
10 (very fair)’.
The second treatment variable determines whether or not respondents were
confronted with a set of arguments concerning the policy proposal after they
had given their own opinion but before they were asked to assess the opinion
of others. Only in the treatment with this information (Arguments), we posed
question B: ‘Below you ﬁnd six arguments concerning the mortgage inter-
est deductibility. Could you assign a total of 100 points to these arguments?
3 The full text of the complete set of questions is available from the authors upon request.146 ELINE V. D. HEIJDEN, JAN NELISSEN AND JAN POTTERS
TABLE 1 – OVERVIEW OF THE TREATMENTS
Treatment Scenario Arguments Paid Question order # Usable responses
1 Ambiguous No No A1, C1 271
2 Ambiguous Yes No A1, B, C1 92
3 Ambiguous No Yes A1, C2 278
4 Ambiguous Yes Yes A1, B, C2 119
5 Speciﬁc No No A2, C1 194
6 Speciﬁc Yes No A2, B, C1 142
7 Speciﬁc No Yes A2, C2 261
8 Speciﬁc Yes Yes A2, B, C2 97
Please assign more points to the argument you consider more relevant, and
fewer points to the argument you consider less relevant’.4
The third treatment variable relates to the incentive to provide an accu-
rate estimate of others’ opinion. In one treatment (Not paid), respondents did
not receive monetary incentives. They were asked Question C1: ‘What do you
think the average answer (grade) is by the members of the panel to the ques-
tion whether a restriction of the mortgage interest deductibility is fair?’. In
the other treatment (Paid), the respondents were in a contest for a prize of
100 Euro to report an accurate estimate. They were asked Question C2: ‘What
do you think the average answer (grade) is by the members of the panel to the
question whether a restriction of the mortgage interest deductibility is fair?
If out of 100 respondents you are the one who estimates this grade best you
earn 100 Euro’. In all treatments this question (C1 or C2) was asked after the
opinion question, such that paying subjects for their estimates or not should
not inﬂuence one’s opinion.
Depending on the causes of the consensus effect, we expect to ﬁnd differ-
ent effects of the three treatment variables. First consider object construal,
which suggests that questions with wider latitude of interpretation will show a
stronger consensus effect than questions permitting only a more narrow inter-
pretation. In our study the policy proposal in which a speciﬁc upper limit on
the size of the mortgage is mentioned (Speciﬁc) is expected to be less open
to interpretation than the more general proposal (Ambiguous). In particular,
the Speciﬁc scenario hints much more directly at the (unfair) redistributional
consequences of the mortgage deductibility. This gives our ﬁrst hypothesis:
4 Two of the six arguments were in favour of the proposed policy change (e.g., people with
high income beneﬁt more from full deductibility than people with low income), two argued
against a change (e.g., a restriction leads to ﬁnancial problems of house owners), and two
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Hypothesis 1.
H0: Speciﬁcity does not affect the consensus effect.
H1: Speciﬁcity weakens the consensus effect.
The second hypothesis concerns the effect of monetary incentives. If the
consensus effect is related to motivational mechanisms such as self-esteem
maintenance and need for social support, one can argue that the relative
importance of these motivations is reduced (crowded out) by payment. Being
right may be a substitute motive for being similar if accuracy is rewarded.
This yields the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2.
H0: Monetary incentives do not affect the consensus effect.
H1: Monetary incentives weaken the consensus effect.
The third hypothesis concerns the provision of arguments pro and contra
the proposed policy change. Receiving these arguments may alert respondents
to the fact that there are several sides to the issue. Their own opinions and
those of others they know as well as the arguments on which these opinions
are based are unlikely to be the full story. Learning about different arguments
and being invited to think about them carefully may reduce the sample selec-
tion bias that may result from selective exposure and availability. This moti-
vates the following.
Hypothesis 3.
H0: The provision of arguments does not affect the consensus effect.
H1: The provision of arguments weakens the consensus effect.
Obviously, the three explanations underlying hypotheses 1–3 (object con-
strual, motivation, selective exposure) are not mutually exclusive. It may even
be the case that they are complementary and reinforce one another.
Finally, it has been argued that the strength of a (false) consensus effect
may depend on the importance of the item under consideration (Crano
(1983), Campbell (1986), Marks and Miller (1987)). In the literature there
exist two competing predictions with regard to the effects of topic relevance
on the consensus effect. On the one hand, Crano (1983) reports that subjects
give higher consensus estimates for opinions on topics in which they have a
vested interest. Campbell (1986), on the other hand, ﬁnds that topic relevance
is associated with weaker consensus effects. The last hypothesis aims to con-
tribute to these arguments:
Hypothesis 4.
H0: Topic relevance does not affect the consensus effect.
H1: Topic relevance affects the consensus effect.148 ELINE V. D. HEIJDEN, JAN NELISSEN AND JAN POTTERS
When testing Hypothesis 4 we will use house ownership as a proxy for
topic relevance, because obviously house owners are more closely involved in
maintaining mortgage deductibility than tenants.
In the next section we will ﬁrst present an analysis of people’s opinions
about changes in the tax deductibility of the interest on mortgages. This is
a hotly debated policy issue, and our data can illuminate people’s stands on
the topic. Thereafter, section 4 will be devoted to an analysis of the consen-
sus effect and a test of the hypotheses put forward above. In what follows we
will indicate the answer to Question A1 or A2 by ‘Opinion’ and the answer
to Question C1 or C2 by ‘Estimate’.
3 OPINIONS ON THE TAX DEDUCTIBILITY OF MORTGAGES
Averaged over all treatments we ﬁnd that the average grade given to a restric-
tion of the tax deductibility is 5.28 on a scale of 1 to 10, which can be con-
sidered as only weak support for such a restriction. A proposal to restrict the
deductibility meets with much more support, however, if it applies to mort-
gages as of 180000 Euro. The average Opinion in the Speciﬁc scenario is 5.70,
and almost one point higher than the average Opinion in the Ambiguous sce-
nario (4.88). The difference between the two grades is signiﬁcant at the 1%
level.5 A small majority (56.7%) give a grade of 5 or less in the Ambiguous
scenario, whereas in the Speciﬁc scenario a majority (55%) give a grade of 6
or more.6 The difference is as expected since compared to the current situa-
tion in the Netherlands the speciﬁc scenario is a more moderate (less extreme)
proposal as it affects only higher mortgages rather than all mortgages.
Because the tax deductibility is highly debated among politicians, it is
interesting to see how people’s views vary with their political orientation.
Table 2 indicates how Opinion varies with the political party they intend
to vote for in the next election (which was the 2002 election at the time).
Roughly speaking, the support for a restriction decreases if we move from
left to right in the political spectrum. Respondents that intend to vote for
the SP (socialist) are most in favour of a restriction, but also amongst CU
(social-christian) and GL (green party) voters many people seem to support
the proposal. Most resistance can be found among people who vote for VVD
(conservative), followed closely by CDA voters (christian democratic). The
5 Unless mentioned otherwise, all tests are two-sided non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-tests.
6 Out of the total sample (including "I don’t know" responses), we ﬁnd that 42.6% give
a grade of 6 to the proposal for restriction. This is roughly in line with a recent ques-
tionnaire conducted by research bureau OTB / Intomart by order of Vereniging Eigen Huis
in April 2006 in which it was found that in total about 45% of the respondents believe
that the deductibility should be completely abolished or restricted (see http://renteaftrek.ei-
genhuis.nl/Default.aspx?tabid=147).OPINIONS ON THE TAX DEDUCTIBILITY OF MORTGAGES 149
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99 4.76 (3.14) 6.59 (2.95)
Don’t know yet 227 4.71 (2.91) 5.29 (2.77)
Won’t vote 46 4.45 (3.43) 6.58 (2.64)
Total 1283 4.88 (2.93) 5.70 (2.88)
Notes: a The list of political preferences is exclusive of SGP (preferred by 10) and Seniorenpartij
(preferred by 1).
bAt the time the survey was conducted, this party was still led by Pim Fortuyn. He started a new
party (LPF = Lijst Pim Fortuyn) a few months later.
cStandard deviations of Opinion are in parentheses.
Speciﬁc proposal is considered to be fairer than the Ambiguous proposal, and
this holds irrespective of one’s political preference.7
Table 2 classiﬁes respondents on the basis of their political preference, but
it is likely that other personal characteristics affect their attitude as well. A
clear variable of interest is house ownership. As could be expected tenants
judge the restrictions as fairer than house owners do. Interestingly, the differ-
ence between tenants and house owners is much larger for the Ambiguous
scenario (5.94 vs. 4.45) than for the Speciﬁc scenario (6.10 vs. 5.57). The
different views of tenants and house owners are illustrated in Figure 1 which
7 That fairness is a serious concern is also reﬂected in the scores that people assign to the
different arguments. The argument with the highest score is that “A restriction will bring many
household in ﬁnancial troubles”, closely followed by the argument that “House owners with a
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Figure1–F r equency distribution of opinions by tenants and house owners for Ambiguous
(upper panel) and Speciﬁc (lower panel) proposal
shows the distribution of Opinions of both groups for the two scenarios sep-
arately. It can be seen that a large fraction of house owners considers the
Ambiguous scenario as extremely unfair (grade 0 or 1), while this fraction is
much smaller for the Speciﬁc scenario. Overall, the distinction between own-
ers and tenants is smaller in the Speciﬁc scenario.
When we consider the impact of other socio-demographic characteristics in
a systematic way by running a simple OLS regression (not reported here in
full) it turns out that the proposal receives more support from older, higher
educated, and lower-income persons, in the sense that the coefﬁcients of these
variables are signiﬁcantly different from zero. Other background variables
(sex, family composition, and religious orientation) appear to have little sys-
tematic relationship with the opinion on the mortgage deductibility. This sug-
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We also asked people whether they expected that the mortgage deductibility
would be restricted in the future. Remarkably, we ﬁnd that a majority (58%)
anticipate a restriction. Furthermore, this percentage is signiﬁcantly higher
among tenants (69%) than among house owners (54%). This difference could
be interpreted as wishful thinking. Another possibility is that house owners
know more house owners and tenants know more tenants and that this causes
a bias in expectations concerning the political support for a restriction (much
in line with a consensus effect).
Finally, we would like to mention that for the Ambiguous scenario the
average Estimate (i.e. the answer to the question about the average grade of
the panel members, C1 or C2) is almost identical to the average Opinion (4.87
vs. 4.88) whereas in the Speciﬁc scenario the former is almost 0.5 lower (5.26
vs. 5.70). On average, people seem to underestimate the degree of support for
a restriction of the tax deductibility if this restriction applies only to mort-
gages above a certain lower bound. This suggests that people’s own opinions
are strongly affected by redistributional considerations but that they underes-
timate the degree to which others’ opinions are.
In summary, we ﬁnd that opinions vary quite predictably with political
preferences and with personal circumstances and with house ownership in
particular. At the same time, opinions seem to converge considerably if the
tax deductibility is restricted only for mortgages as of a certain size.
4 THE CONSENSUS EFFECT
In this section we will examine the presence of a consensus effect and analyze
how it varies with the treatment variables of our design and with the socio-
economic background variables of the respondents. For that purpose we will
relate people’s own opinion to their estimate about other people’s opinion.
First, Table 3 presents for each treatment separately the average values of
Opinion (fourth column) and Estimate (ﬁfth column), as well as the corre-
lation between Opinion and Estimate (sixth column). We can see that in all
but two treatments, the correlation coefﬁcients are between 0.34 and 0.55 and
they are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. They are highest when respon-
dents receive no arguments (Arguments = No) and are not paid for accu-
racy (Paid = No), whereas the correlation coefﬁcients drop considerably when
both arguments and monetary incentives are provided. The correlation is even
insigniﬁcant in the Ambiguous treatment. This suggests that the size of the
consensus effect is affected by both cognitive and motivational factors and
that a combination of information and monetary incentives reduces the effect.
In order to test the hypotheses more formally we ﬁrst perform OLS
regressions in which we take Estimate as the dependent variable. Opinion is
included as an explanatory variable, and we take the estimated coefﬁcient
for Opinion as a measure for the consensus effect. We also include dummy152 ELINE V. D. HEIJDEN, JAN NELISSEN AND JAN POTTERS
TABLE 3 – AVERAGE OPINION, AVERAGE ESTIMATE, AND THE CORRELATIONS
BETWEEN THEM
Scenario Arguments Paid Opinion Estimate Correlation
Ambiguous No No 4.95 (2.90) 4.67 (1.93) 0.544 ***
Ambiguous Yes No 4.69 (2.96) 4.99 (2.02) 0.421 ***
Ambiguous No Yes 4.87 (2.93) 4.85 (2.17) 0.452 ***
Ambiguous Yes Yes 4.91 (2.98) 5.27 (2.23) 0.122
Ambiguous 4.88 (2.93) 4.87 (2.09) 0.419 ***
Speciﬁc No No 5.77 (2.89) 5.09 (1.96) 0.422 ***
Speciﬁc Yes No 5.57 (2.77) 5.29 (1.94) 0.354 ***
Speciﬁc No Yes 5.77 (2.91) 5.34 (1.97) 0.343 ***
Speciﬁc Yes Yes 5.60 (2.97) 5.31 (2.19) 0.209 **
Speciﬁc 5.70 (2.88) 5.26 (1.99) 0.351 ***
Notes: Standard deviation between parentheses. Reported correlation is Spearman’s ρ, whereby
*** indicates signiﬁcant at 0.01, ** signiﬁcant at 0.05, * signiﬁcant at 0.10
variables for the three treatments, and ﬁrst and higher order interaction terms
between Opinion and the three treatment dummies. These interaction terms
allow us to test whether any of the treatment variables strengthens or weak-
ens the consensus effect, either separately or in combination.
To test the effect of background variables, and in particular their possible
impact on the consensus effect, we add these variables (which are all trans-
















where α, β, γj, δj, ηjk, and θ, are coefﬁcients, λ and μ are vectors of coefﬁ-
cients, Estimate is a respondent’s estimate of the average Opinion, Opinion is
a respondent’s own opinion on restricting the tax provision, T1 =Speciﬁc, T2 =
Paid, T3 = Arguments are the treatment dummies. Furthermore, Z is a vec-
tor of seven dummy variables, which take on a value of one, respectively, if a
respondent (a) is tenant, (b) is relatively poor, i.e. has a net household income
8 As the dependent variable Estimate takes values in the range [0,10] a transformation may
seem appropriate. However, using log ((Estimate/(10−Estimate)) does not yield better or differ-
ent results, whereas the error term when using Estimate appears to follow a normal distribu-
tion too. We therefore use the standard speciﬁcation, which is easier to interpret.OPINIONS ON THE TAX DEDUCTIBILITY OF MORTGAGES 153
TABLE 4 – REGRESSION RESULTS FOR ESTIMATE
OLS 2SLS
coeff p-value coeff p-value
Intercept 3.127 0.000 1.829 0.004
Opinion 0.339 0.000 0.559 0.000
Paid 0.371 0.002 0.298 0.033
Arguments 0.604 0.000 0.457 0.009
Opinion×Paid×Arg −0.099 0.003 −0.036 0.449
Tenant 0.616 0.030 1.273 0.227
Opinion×Tenant −0.116 0.009 −0.210 0.286
Poor 0.599 0.009 1.700 0.054
Opinion×Poor −0.070 0.066 −0.259 0.121
Educate −0.381 0.001 −0.272 0.024
Children −0.273 0.016 −0.232 0.064
R2 0.177 0.043
Notes: The number of observations is 1224. In the 2SLS regression, we have used the predic-
tion for Opinion rather than the value of Opinion, which was obtained by regressing Opinion on
dummy variables for political preference, age categories and gender.
below the median value in the sample (<C2045 per month), (c) has a college
education or higher, (d) is a student, (e) is married or cohabiting (f) has chil-
dren, or (g) is religious.
We ﬁrst estimated the complete model, that is, with all 26 independent
variables. In this model, 16 of the estimated coefﬁcient turn out to be statis-
tically insigniﬁcantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. In order to
correct for possible speciﬁcation error, we next used a backward elimination
procedure in which in each step the variable with the smallest partial corre-
lation with the dependent variable is removed. This procedure ends with all
remaining variables having estimated coefﬁcients that are signiﬁcantly differ-
ent from zero at least at the 10 percent level. The OLS estimation results for
the model that remains after this procedure can be found in columns 2 and
3 of Table 4 (columns 4 and 5 are discussed below).
Note ﬁrst that the regression results verify the existence of a clear consen-
sus effect: the estimated coefﬁcient β is positive, 0.339, and statistically signiﬁ-
cant (p<0.001). The coefﬁcient can be interpreted as the average size of the
consensus effect in the Ambiguous treatment, without Arguments and Paid,
i.e. when all treatment and demographic dummies are equal to zero.
Next we see that the treatment dummies for Arguments and Paid have
a statistically signiﬁcant positive effect on Estimate.9 If people are provided
with arguments pro and contra a policy chance, they tend to give higher esti-
9 Recall from the design (Table 1) that the treatments Arguments and Paid may affect the
Estimates (questions C1 and C2) but not the Opinions (questions A1 and A2). Mann–Whitney154 ELINE V. D. HEIJDEN, JAN NELISSEN AND JAN POTTERS
mates, which suggests that on balance the arguments in favour are consid-
ered stronger. The provision of incentives for accuracy also tends to produce
higher estimates. Both of these, however, are direct effects on Estimates (i.e.,
not mediated by Opinion) and hence they have no bearing on the consensus
effect.
The impact of the treatments on the consensus effect is measured by the
interactions between the treatment dummies and Opinion. Here it turns out
that the ﬁrst order interactions between Opinion and the treatment dummies
yield estimated coefﬁcients (δj) that are not signiﬁcantly different from zero
(and always smaller than 0.04 in absolute size). Of the three second order
interactions only the coefﬁcient (η23) for Paid × Argument × Opinion is sig-
niﬁcantly different from zero. This effect was already suggested by an anal-
ysis of the correlation coefﬁcients in Table 3. The negative coefﬁcient indi-
cates that the consensus effect is reduced if subjects are provided both with
arguments pro and contra and with incentives to provide accurate estimates.
Moreover, this effect is substantial (−0.099); reducing the consensus effect by
almost 30%. The other second order interaction terms are not statistically sig-
niﬁcantly different from zero and small in size.10
Of the background variables (Z), in particular the distinction between ten-
ants and house owners proves relevant. House owners not only judge the pro-
posal as less fair than tenants do, they also think that other people give a
lower grade. The interaction effect between tenants and Opinion is relatively
large and negative (and signiﬁcantly so) indicating that on average tenants
submit Estimates that are less closely related to their own Opinion than do
house owners.
Furthermore, people with an income below the median give a signiﬁcantly
higher estimate, which is to be expected in view of the redistributional con-
sequences of the proposed policy. The interaction effect with Opinion is con-
siderable in size and negative, suggesting that relatively poor people are less
affected by the consensus effect. Having children and having a college edu-
cation or higher also induces lower Estimates but the interaction with Opin-
ion is not statistically (or economically) different from zero. The other back-
ground variables (religion, marital status, education, student) yield small and
statistically insigniﬁcant estimates and seem to have at most a minor effect on
the size of the consensus effect.
Relating these results to the hypotheses it appears that Speciﬁcity has
no signiﬁcant effect on the size of the consensus effect. The null-version
of Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected. The same holds for Hypothesis 2 and
Hypothesis 3, meaning that the provision of monetary incentives and the pro-
U test reveal indeed no signiﬁcant difference across the Paid/Not Paid treatment and the
Arguments/No Arguments treatment for Opinion.
10 The result of a F-test indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefﬁcients of
the seven Opinion-treatment interaction terms (δj, ηjk, θ) are jointly equal to zero (p=0.12).OPINIONS ON THE TAX DEDUCTIBILITY OF MORTGAGES 155
vision of arguments pro and contra do not reduce the consensus effect, if con-
sidered in isolation. The signiﬁcant effect of the interaction term for Paid ×
Argument × Opinion, however, shows that in combination the provision of
incentives and arguments do reduce the consensus effect. This suggests that
both motivational and cognitive factors play a role. The (strong) effect of
ownership is in line with Crano’s ﬁndings that subjects give higher consen-
sus estimates on issues in which they have a vested interest (Crano (1983)),
meaning that we can reject the H0 version of Hypothesis 4 in favour of H1.
Finally, we perform a robustness check on the results of the OLS esti-
mation results. This model assumes that Opinion is an exogenous variable,
while one could argue that actually both Estimate and Opinion are endoge-
nous variables.11 Therefore, we estimated a second model (2SLS), which takes
this into account, by not including Opinion directly, but replacing it by an
instrumental variable which is independent of the error term in the original
speciﬁcation.12 For the model we use the exact same speciﬁcation as the OLS
model reported in Table 4. The results reveal that the estimated coefﬁcient for
the consensus effect is still statistically signiﬁcant if we take an instrument for
Opinion and the size of the effect even increases substantially. Also the signs
and sizes of most of the other estimated coefﬁcients match those of the OLS
model very well, even though some of the effects lose statistical signiﬁcance.
Overall, however, we can say that the results are fairly robust.
5 RESULTS ON ACCURACY AND INCENTIVE EFFECTS
In this section we present some additional results on the accuracy of the esti-
mates and on incentive effects.
5.1 Accuracy
For each respondent we have computed the error as the absolute value of the
difference between the Estimate and the mean value of Opinion in the rele-
vant scenario (Speciﬁc or Ambiguous). Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 show the
mean errors by treatment for all respondents (the last four columns will be
discussed later).
From the table we can infer that the mean errors are not much affected by
the treatment variables. Whether or not Arguments are provided before the
Estimate does not have any effect on the average error. Remarkably, paying
the subjects for making accurate estimates does not make errors smaller. In
11 We thank a referee for pointing this out to us.
12 Just as in Harmon et al. (2003) for example, when constructing an instrument for Opin-
ion we only use variables that affect Opinion (see section 3) and at the same time are likely
to be exogenous to Estimate (namely dummy variables for political preference, age categories
and gender). These variables are omitted from the model for Estimate.156 ELINE V. D. HEIJDEN, JAN NELISSEN AND JAN POTTERS
TABLE 5 – MEAN ABSOLUTE ERRORS BY TREATMENT
Scenario Arguments All respondents Owners Tenants
Not Paid Paid Not Paid Paid Not Paid Paid
Ambiguous No 1.59 1.89 1.63 1.88 1.47 1.89
Ambiguous Yes 1.66 1.99 1.72 2.00 1.51 1.93
Speciﬁc No 1.65 1.70 1.70 1.79 1.53 1.50
Speciﬁc Yes 1.54 1.89 1.48 1.97 1.70 1.74
Total 1.60 1.83 1.63 1.88 1.54 1.71
fact, errors are larger in the Paid treatment, and this is the only effect that
is statistically signiﬁcant if we run a simple OLS regression with the absolute
error as the dependent variable and dummies for the treatment variables as
explanatory variables.
Marks and Miller (1987) and Campbell (1986) argued that the accuracy
of estimations increases as opinion relevance (i.e. personal importance of the
issue) increases. Applied to our situation this suggests that house owners make
more accurate estimates. The mean errors by treatment for house owners and
tenants separately, as shown in the last four columns of Table 4 do not lend
support to the claim: if anything, house owners make less accurate estimates
than tenants. Indeed, if we extend the above-mentioned analysis with the abso-
lute error as dependent variable by adding ownership as explanatory variable in
addition to dummies for the treatment variables, it turns out that the estimated
coefﬁcient for owner is signiﬁcantly positive, as it is for Paid.13
5.2 Incentive Effect
The analyses in the previous sections suggest that paying or not paying the
subjects does not have a very strong effect on the size of the consensus effect,
and that an effect is likely to occur mainly if Arguments are provided as well.
Does this imply that there is hardly any incentive effect at all? When we look
more closely at the answers, some remarkable differences between the Paid
and the Not Paid treatment can be observed.
First, the fraction of “I don’t know” answers to the estimation question is
considerably lower in the payment treatment (8.5%) than in no-payment treat-
ment (17.3%). This, of course, makes sense. Even if people really have no clue,
they still have an incentive to submit an Estimate in order to be eligible for
the 100 Euro in the Paid treatment.
13 Campbell (1986) also suggested that respondents might be less biased and more accurate
on issues that are relevant to them because they would be better informed about these issues.
This argument suggests an interaction effect between information and ownership, but we do
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Moreover, the number of people who chose a prominent number (i.e. x.00
or x.50) is clearly affected by monetary incentives. The fraction of subjects
submitting such numbers is 74.9% (n=729) in the Not Paid treatment, but
only 24.4% (n=804) in the Paid treatment. So although payment does not
lead to substantial qualitative differences, it seems to affect people and to
motivate them to make other (but not more precise) estimates. If we perform
a logistic regression with Prominence (being 1 if a prominent number has
been given and 0 otherwise) as the dependent variable, and the treatment vari-
ables, socio-economic variables, and interaction terms between the socio-eco-
nomic variables and the Paid treatment variable as the independent variables,
it turns out that Paid is a highly signiﬁcant variable, reducing the number
of prominent estimates. The other two treatment variables have coefﬁcients
that are not signiﬁcantly different from zero. (And why would they?) From
the interaction effects with Paid we can infer that younger, male and more
educated respondents are more strongly affected by the Paid treatment, giv-
ing fewer prominent estimates when paid for making accurate estimates.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Our study started from the observation in the social psychological literature
that expectations about the behaviour and preferences of others are positively
correlated with one’s own behaviour and preferences. This consensus effect
may have important implications for economics. In this paper we have consid-
ered the role of the consensus effect in relationship to an issue that has been
under much debate in the Netherlands, namely the proposal to restrict the tax
deductibility of interest payments on mortgages.
Concerning the restriction of the tax deductibility it appears that a small
majority of the 1454 Dutch respondents consider the proposal to restrict the
mortgage interest deductibility when no upper limit is set to be unfair (i.e.
they gave a grade of at most a 5) whereas a small majority consider the pro-
posal to restrict the interest deductibility for mortgages above a certain size
to be fair (i.e. they gave at least a 6). The proposal is received more posi-
tively among left wing voters (SP, Groen Links) than among right wing voters
(CDA, VVD), and more positively among tenants than house owners. Also
people with incomes below the median, those with relatively high education,
and those above a certain age tend to be more positive toward a restriction.
We found clear indications for the existence of a consensus effect in our
experiment i.e. respondents estimates of others’ opinions are strongly related
to their own opinion. We examined the effect of three treatment variables that
were each motivated by one of the possible causes of the consensus effect.
One of the treatments was the Speciﬁcity of the policy proposal, a variable
that was motivated by the possible impact of object construal. We found no
evidence that it affected the size of the consensus effect. We did ﬁnd a small158 ELINE V. D. HEIJDEN, JAN NELISSEN AND JAN POTTERS
effect of the other two treatments: the provision of Arguments pro and con-
tra the proposal, and the presence of monetary incentive to give an accurate
estimate about others’ opinions. In particular, the results show that these two
treatment variables may be complementary. If this is the case it suggests that
in order to reduce the consensus effect both the effect of selective exposure
(sample selection bias) and motivational factors have to be overcome. This
complements Engelmann and Strobel’s (2000) ﬁnding that a false consensus
effect only disappears if information about other people is presented to sub-
jects on a silver platter, such that no cognitive effort is needed to use relevant
information.
Among the socio-demographic variables by far the most important one
was house ownership. House owners indicated a much lower support for
the policy proposal. More interesting is that they also displayed a much
stronger consensus effect. As house owners have a strong vested interest in
the tax regime toward mortgages this suggests that topic relevance tends to
strengthen the consensus effect.
The results may help explain why the tax deductibility of mortgage inter-
ests is such a sensitive issue in (Dutch) politics, considered to be best left
untouched by politicians. Not only do vested interests and opinions differ
widely among the population, due to the consensus effect people also tend to
regard their own opinions as representative for those of others. As a result
they will have little understanding for the fact that others have a different
opinion. This widens the gap between the proponents and the opponents of a
policy change, and hampers the prospects for compromise and consensus. Our
results suggest that in order to facilitate a policy change, it is best to propose
a restriction of the deductibility only for mortgages as of a certain size. This
increases the support across the board, but it also narrows the opinion differ-
ences between tenants and house-owners. Moreover, when people are actively
encouraged to take notice of the arguments of both sides they seem to better
appreciate the fact that others have a different opinion. This may also make
a policy change easier.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the consensus effect may also be relevant for eco-
nomic settings in which people have an incentive to be as accurate as possi-
ble about the behaviour or preferences of others. Think for example of peo-
ple considering starting a business and having to estimate market demand
while knowing their own preferences. If a consensus effect were due to moti-
vational factors only one might expect it to disappear when there is enough at
stake. However, cognitive limitations will not always be counteracted merely
by means of incentives. In particular, in order to reduce the force of selective
exposure and availability (sample selection bias) it is likely that people need
to be exposed to debiasing information about the preferences and beliefs of
others and need to be motivated to use this information.OPINIONS ON THE TAX DEDUCTIBILITY OF MORTGAGES 159
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